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ABSTRACT
Within the corporate governance literature the notion of diversity has emerged as an important
regulatory mechanism (See for example the Tyson Report 2003). This interest has emerged in
part due to various national legislative reforms introducing mandatory quotas for female
directors. As the debate surrounding these reforms emerges and begins to take form, it is
important that the prevailing paradigm of democracy is not taken for granted but is subject to
critical scrutiny. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s On Populist Reason in particular, the paper
attempts to problematize notions of difference and representational democracy that lie at the
heart of the reforms. The aim of the paper is to stimulate further debate on the democratizing
potential of the recent political interventions in the composition of the boards of directors.
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RESUMEN
Dentro de la literatura de gobierno corporativo la noción de diversidad ha surgido como un
mecanismo de regulación importante (Ver por ejemplo el Informe Tyson 2003). Este interés
ha surgido en parte debido a varias reformas legislativas que han introducido cuotas
femeninas obligatorias en la dirección. Ya que el debate sobre estas reformas  empieza a tomar
forma, es importante que el paradigma de democracia prevaleciente no se tome por sentado
sino que sea un tema de análisis crítico. Basándonos en el trabajo de Ernesto Laclaus On
Populist Reason, este artículo intenta examinar las nociones de diferencia y democracia en la
representación que subyacen en el centro de las reformas. El último objetivo de este artículo
es estimular el debate sobre el potencial de democratización de las recientes regulaciones
políticas sobre la composición de la dirección de los consejos.
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INTRODUCTION
The board of directors has traditionally comprised of a group of homogeneous individuals
from similar socio-economic backgrounds.  Westphal and Milton (2000: 366) for example,
contend that they, “have similar educational and professional training and as a result have
very similar views about business practices”.  They have been criticized for being
ineffective and condemned as, “an impotent, ceremonial and legal fiction” (Drucker
1974).  This was most famously the case in Monk’s advertisement in the Wall Street
Journal which labeled the directors of Sears, Roebuck & Company, “non-performing
assets” (Monks & Minow, 2001).  They have also been criticized for their “clubby and
elitist culture,” (McGregor 2000: 136) and for being “citadels of patriarchal values”
(McGregor 2000: 129).  
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the issue of board diversity is emerging as an
important aspect of corporate governance within current regulatory prescriptions
(Simmers, 1998). In the UK for example, The Tyson Report (2003) has suggested that
greater diversity in the board of directors will contribute towards enhanced organizational
performance.  Although diversity is often construed in terms of different professional
affiliations, experience and expertise (Milliken & Martins, 1996), this emerging discourse
is also related to changing socio-cultural attitudes towards age, ethnicity and biological
gender.  Indeed Carter et al (2003) conclude that the gender and cultural makeup of the
board of directors is one of the most pressing current issues in relation to the governance
of large corporations.
There would seem to be at least four reasons why board diversity has emerged as a pressing
concern. Specifically this growing interest is broadly related to: recent failures in corporate
governance; pressure from advocacy groups and institutional investors; new equal
opportunities legislation and finally, the potential impact of diversity on corporate performance.
Firstly, there has been increased scrutiny of the composition of the board of directors in
the wake of the recent spate of corporate scandals (Collier 2008; Solomon 2007; Van den
Berghe & Levrau 2004; Erhardt et al et al 2003). A number of commentators have
suggested, for example, that the failings of Enron’s board, was somehow related to its lack
of diversity (Erhardt et al 2003).  The focus of this literature is whether reforming the
composition of boards might be an effective way to re-establish trust in corporations.
Secondly, however, advocacy groups and institutional investors are also placing pressure
on corporations (Carter et al, 2003). The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility
(ICCR) for example has initiated a number of shareholder resolutions on the issue of
greater diversity within the boards of major corporations (Carter et al, 2003). Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF),
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one of the largest financial services firms in America, also advocates greater gender, age
and race diversity at the board level (Carter et al, 2003). 
Thirdly, within Europe at least, pressure is coming in the form of new legislation on equality
of opportunities and diversity in the workplace (the Employment Directive (2000); Race
Directive (2000) and the Directive on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (2006)).
These directives draw on a liberal tradition of human rights. The Equality Act (2006) for
example brings together the Disability Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities
Commission into a new Commission for Equality and Human rights (Thomas 2008). 
In some instances, these legislative shifts have seen the introduction of mandatory quotas.
In Spain for example, new equality legislation stipulates that by 2015 at least 40% of all
board of directors of public companies must be women
1
. While the nature of the sanctions
that will be applied to companies who fail to meet these targets is imprecise, there is an
expectation that preference will be given in the award of government contracts to
companies that meet the new legislative requirements.  While these changes are justified
in terms of a potentially positive impact on corporate performance, their underlying
motivation is as much related to social justice issues as they are to profitability.  Brammer,
Millington & Pavelin (2007; see also Carver 2002) for example suggest that positive quotas
in management boards may be motivated by a desire to make recompense for historical
injustices. Greater board room diversity is therefore justified in terms of both the social
consequences and the economic consequences of a more equal representation at powerful
decision making levels.  Within the EU, these developments find their roots in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and can be seen as an extension of attempts to
secure greater diversity in political representation through, for example, more balanced
gender lists.  In recognition of the power and significance of corporations in society the
same principles are now being applied to large corporations.  The introduction of quotas
at the board level in part represents an attempt to secure attitudinal and structural change
and rests on notions of human rights and representational democracy.
It is perhaps therefore, not surprising that more CEO’s are now beginning to comment on
the importance of board room diversity within their annual reports and the empirical
literature also suggests that boards are becoming more diverse (Van Der Walt & Ingley
2003; Brancato & Patterson 1999; Burke, 1995; Daily et al 1999).
However, the growing interest in difference and diversity is not just confined to board rooms.
The discourse of multiculturalism is very much part of the current political discourse and
policy agenda in the West. Avtar Brah (2000) for example, comments, ‘Difference, Diversity,
pluralism, Hybridity… these are some of the most debated and contested terms of our time.’
Board Diversity, The Logic of Difference & The Logic of Equivalence
(1) Currently around 6.6% of boardroom positions in Spain are occupied by women (Lewis & Rake, 2008).
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Yet within the governance literature much of the discussion of diversity and difference
appears not to engage either with the broader political agendas motivating recent legislative
reforms or the broader discourse that problematizes the notion of difference and questions
the pluralistic assumptions behind the mandated quotas. Rather, the discussion remains
entrenched within long established agency theory models (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
While the literature on board diversity contains a number of helpful insights, there has as
yet been few contributions which attempt to engage with the theoretical and political
nature of the idea of diversity or the significance of the broader political discourse that is
beginning to connect multiculturalism, corporate governance and representational
democracy (Although see Adams & McPhail 2004). This paper contributes to the
burgeoning literature on managerial diversity in two ways. Firstly, in contrast to the
established agency perspectives, the paper notes the emergence of a small body of work
that links stakeholder perspectives, corporate governance, diversity and representational
democracy and in doing so seems to implicitly support the underlying political ideology
that is behind some of the recent legislative reforms. The paper notes and supports the
emergence of this alternative space for reflecting on board diversity. Secondly, the paper
contributes to this emerging literature by presenting some critical reflections on the
ideological commitment to representational forms of democracy in particular. This critique
draws heavily on the work of Ernesto Laclau’s and in particular his 2005 work: On Populist
Reason. The paper brings Laclau’s critical analysis of the political economy of difference
to the discussion of corporate diversity with the aim of further opening up the emerging
alternative literature on the democratizing potential of the recent political interventions in
the composition of the boards of directors. The premise of the paper is that as this debate
emerges and begins to take form, it is important that the prevailing paradigm of democracy
is not taken for granted but also subject to critical scrutiny (Brown 2009). As such, the
paper represents a response to Roberts et al’s (2005) call for a broader range of theoretical
perspectives to be developed into the study of boardroom diversity.  
In order to achieve this aim, the paper is structured as follows. Section one provides an
introduction to the discussion of diversity within the management and organizational
literature.  It provides a brief overview of the predominant perspective that has historically
determined the boundaries of discussion that it has been possible to have in relation to
board diversity. This overview provides the context for introducing the emerging
stakeholder perspective in the following section. Within recent work on stakeholder
perspectives the issue of representational democracy is emerging as a key idea within
corporate governance and this development provides the link into the third section.
Section three draws on Ernesto Laclau’s work, On Populist Reason, in order to provide a
critical discussion of the assumptions underpinning the emerging representational model
of corporate governance and the prospect of substantive social change. The final section
provides some concluding remarks.
K. McPhail
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ESTABLISHED PERSPECTIVES ON BOARD DIVERSITY &
ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE
The predominant theoretical perspective that has traditionally shaped how we think about
the function of the board within corporations draws heavily on an agency theory view of the
firm, often supplemented with a complementary resource perspective. In both instances
the background assumption is that the primary objective of the board is to maximise
shareholder value. Within this predominant perspective, diversity is construed in terms of
the extent to which the occupational status of an individual might render them more or less
independent; the occupational capital and personal attributes. Difference is viewed
instrumentally and is seen to have a value in use.
Agency Theory 
Agency theory has provided the primary theoretical lens for studying the relationship
between the composition of the board and the value of the firm
2
(Fama & Jensen 1983).
From this perspective, the primary function of the board is seen to be the resolution of
conflicts of interest between shareholders and the management of the corporation
(Brennan & Solomon 2008). The key focus is on the interests and rights of the
shareholders
3
(Brennan & Solomon 2008). According to Zahra and Pearce (1983, see also
Carter et al 2003; Baysinger & Butler 1985) historically, this has been one of the most
common theoretical perspectives used in the analysis of boards of directors. The key
assumption of this model is that shareholders interests are best served by an independent
board of directors
4
. 
The Resource Perspective
Nicholas van der Walt and Coral Ingley (2003) however contend that, in addition to the
predominant agency theory perspective with its focus on the monitoring function of the
board, a second, resource perspective, views board diversity in terms of the resources that
the organization requires to function most effectively. Robinson and Dechant (1997)
suggest that broad diversity can help in the areas of innovation (Watson et al., 1993) and
cultural sensitivity. Maznevski (1994) suggested that diversity can make for better
communication within the group which in turn leads to better decision making. Other
2
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(2) There is some suggestion that the option of selling through securities markets, the exit option, renders agency problems
less significant as they are made out to be (Baysinger & Butler 1985).
(3) There are plenty of critiques within the literature on the assumptions of the Agency Theory model. This literature
highlights the range of behavioral and non financial characteristics that impact on the performance of the board, including
things like the psychological sense of achievement in doing a job well done and the need for recognition and respect (Argyris
1964; Herzberg 1966; McClelland 1961) and also the sense of identity as an organizational member (Etzioni 1975). 
(4) Much of the discussion around corporate governance starts from the assumption that the performance of the board of
directors does have an impact (Baysinger & Butler 1985). Parts of the literature would at least seem to suggest that the
board is an important factor in the performance of the firm (Williamson, 1964, 1981).  However the corporation is
disciplined by a number of different mechanisms including the markets, both for good managers and capital and off course
the law (Williamson, 1983; Baysinger & Butler 1985; Faith et al. 1984; Fama 1980; Fischel 1982; Jensen and Meckling
1976; Manne 1965; Scott 1983; Williamson, 1981; Wolfson 1980).  So the board is theoretically at least viewed as part of
a suit of disciplinary mechanisms. 
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research however suggests that homogeneous groups perform better than heterogeneous
groups (Hambrick et al. 1996) due to the adverse impact that diversity can have on the
groups’ ability to reach a consensus (Knight et al. 1999). While many of these perspectives
adopt a fairly standard view of the board in terms of their function, others suggest that it
serves a number of different monitoring, executive and instrumental purposes (Baysinger
& Butler 1985). 
Shareholder Wealth Maximisation
Yet regardless of whether a monitoring or a resources perspective is adopted, the
common measure of the success of the board within this prevailing shareholder ideology
is the impact on shareholder value (see Erhardt et al 2003). A study by Carter et al
(2003) for example investigates the relationship between diversity in personal attributes
like age, gender and ethnicity and firm value (see also Erhardt et al 2003). They
reported a positive correlation between firm value and the proportion of women or
minority groups represented on the board. They also note that diversity increases with
both firm and board size.  Brennan and Solomon (2008) conclude that research on board
diversity has been dominated by an underlying assumption of corporate profitability and
shareholder value.  Indeed policy and governance codes in both the UK and the US are
based on the prerogative of enhancing and promoting shareholder value (Brennan &
Solomon 2008).
Conceptions of Diversity within the Established Theoretical Perspectives
Within this prevailing shareholder value focus, the notion of diversity is discussed in three
senses: employee status; occupational attributes and personal attributes.
Employee status relates to the board members status as an employee of the firm. One
strand of the debate on board composition relates to whether board members should come
from inside or outside the organisation. Some authors suggest that none or only very few of
the members of the board should be or have been employees of the corporation (Gupta et
al 2008; Louden 1982; Stone 1975). These authors place a premium on the independence
of the board.  Some suggest that insiders can be more effective because of their knowledge
of the firm. Others however suggest that insiders are not independent and that their
appointment to the board is often used as a way of ensuring the flow of information from
the board to others within the organization (Baysinger & Butler 1985). Finally, some
suggest that there should be a mix of insiders and outsiders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Secondly, occupational or professional attributes refer to the perceived advantages of
having lawyers, financiers and so on, as members of the board. From this perspective,
these individuals are seen to represent helpful connections to external institutions like
finance houses. These types of directors are seen to serve an instrumental function by
linking the organization to other important institutions (Baysinger & Butler 1985; Burt
K. McPhail
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1980; Pfeffer, 1972, 1976; Thompson 1967)
5
. Some of the literature discusses both these
concepts in terms of the kinds of capital that individual board members bring to the
organisation. Nicholas van der Walt and Coral Ingley (2003) for example discuss board
diversity from a social capital perspective.
Finally, the notion of diversity is also discussed in relation to personal attributes like age,
biological gender, ethnicity
6
(Erhardt et al et al 2003; Milliken & Martins, 1996) and even
different cognitive styles (Simons & Pelled 1999). Recent developments within corporate
governance policy focus on this latter type of diversity in personal attributes. 
The majority of the mainstream literature on board diversity is therefore reflective of an
entrenched shareholder ideology (Engelen 2002). The board is viewed as a site for the
negotiation of just two sets of interests: shareholders and managers.  It is assumed that the
primary objective of the board is to maximise shareholder value and this orientation is
justified in terms of shareholders’ property rights. It is also important to note the extent to
which this perspective constructs and sustains notions of difference. Beyond the different
interests of shareholders and management, diversity is construed in relatively
ideologically benign ways in terms of professional affiliation; independence and individual
cognitive styles for example. There is little sense in which difference and diversity might
be seen to represent a fundamental challenge to the prevailing corporate imperative to
maximise profit.  
In contrast to this established perspective, the following section introduces an emerging
body of literature that begins to critique this paradoxically hegemonic view of difference
and the narrow conceptualisation of rights upon which it is based (Engelen 2002). 
EMERGING STAKEHOLDERS AND REPRESENTATIONAL
DEMOCRACY PERSPECTIVES
This section introduces an alternative stakeholder perspective on board diversity that is
emerging within the literature.  Brennan and Solomon (2008: 890, see also Collier 2008)
for example contend,
“more recently, as the consideration of corporate governance has started to broaden in it’s
coverage, there has been a change in emphasis away from the traditional shareholder–centric
approach towards a more stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance.” 
2
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(5) This perspective is related to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).
(6) Sikka (2008) focuses on the role of the importance of workers within systems of corporate governance and it is
interesting that there is comparatively little mention of workers in the discussion of board diversity. 
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This broadening perspective, which draws heavily on Corporate Social Responsibility
ideas (van der Walt & Ingley 2003), promotes greater inclusivity of stakeholder groups
within the governance structures of corporations (Brennan & Solomon 2008). 
Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) explain two alternative justifications for re-conceptualising
the composition of boards in this way. Firstly, they suggest that in contrast to the
shareholder value perspective, the discussion of diversity can be construed in terms of the
obligations that organizations owe to their shareholders and stakeholders
7
(See also Keasey
et al., 1997) or secondly, in terms of broader democratic requirements that governance
structures mirror a pluralistic and multicultural society.  Collier (2008) similarly contends
that “Stakeholder Theory can be seen either in terms of a multiple constituency model of
organisational theory, or from a political science perspective in which accountability to
stakeholders is a form of democratic representation (Simmons 2004).”
8
Thus, in contrast to
the resource perspective of difference discussed above, the emerging “representation”
perspective, attempts to ensure that the board is reflective of a diverse set of interests
(Burton’s 1991).  Ray (2005: 93 see also Joo 2003) highlights some of the reasoning behind
this viewpoint when he states,
“Effective reform in corporate governance means making corporate boards more representative and
democratic…. There are many legal, ideological and political barriers to these forms but if
representative governance and democracy are truly valued they should be applied to an institution
that has huge impact on the lives of individuals and communities in the contemporary world.”
This perspective questions both the priority and conceptual integrity of property rights
within the conventional shareholder orientation of corporate boards (Ray 2005; Engelen
2002) and, in contradistinction to this model, highlights the democratic right to
representation in decisions that directly affect ones life (Ray 2005). As well as asserting
the democratic right to representation, this literature also critiques the conceptualization
of property rights upon which the prevailing shareholder model is based. Engelen (2002:
399) for example, contends that specific property rights are the consequence of historical
power struggles.  He says, ‘Groups differ over time and from each other in their ability to
use the states power to acknowledge their possessions, whether peacefully produced or
brutally conquered as ’rightful property.’” He also emphasizes the relational nature of
ownership claims, stating that, ‘Ownership constitutes a relationship between the owner
and other agents and demarcates relational rights, instead of absolute ones’ Engelen
(2002: 399).
K. McPhail
(7) Brancato and Patterson, (1999) allude to this issue when they refer to comments made by Karen J. Curtin, executive
vice president of Bank America: “There is real debate between those who think we should be more diverse because it is
the right thing to do and those who think we should be more diverse because it actually enhances shareholder value. Unless
we get the second point across, and people believe it, we’re only going to have tokenism” (Quoted in Carter et al. :34)
(8) By contrast, Loft et al. (2006) suggest that the main legitimacy of the broad is based in its expertise rather than its
representative nature.
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Over and above the issue of representation, other commentators focus on the deliberative
forms of decision-making that may be promoted by a diverse board composition (Ray 2005,
Engelen 2002). Jones et al. (2000) for example, talk about a model where there is “multi-
voiced international discourse on issues of difference in organizations”. Some of the
literature, therefore alludes to diversity in terms of representative democracy and
deliberative discourse.  
At the core of this emerging discourse is a contention that the composition of the board
should be modelled along democratic political lines, with a broad diversity of elected
representatives representing the interests of various constituencies (Ray 2005; Engelen
2002). However, see Jensen 1993 for an argument against this kind of model of the board).
This form of regulatory mechanism is presented as an alternative both to self and state
regulation, both of which, it is suggested, have been ineffective (Ray 2005). Ray (2005:
99) for example comments,
“In short, self regulation, governmental regulation, collaborative NGO-corporate problem-
solving and enlightened self interest can all potentially mitigate the worst tendencies of narrow
corporate self-interest, but all depend on optimistic assumptions. A more direct and a more
effective approach may be more heterogeneous boards elected in a more democratic fashion.”
Solomon (2007) suggests that there is at least an allusion to this kind of representative
notion in the Tyson Report (2003). She comments (Solomon 2007: 90, see also Brennan &
Solomon 2008), 
“The Tyson report stressed that widening board diversity would help companies improve their
reputation by engendering trust among their shareholders. The diverse constituencies
underpinning corporate activity would be likely to be more confident in a company whose board
was more representative of broader groups with broader knowledge and understanding. For
example, social and environmental lobby groups would have greater confidence in a company
with a non-executive director whose background was in environmental regulation.’ 
Within the literature, the issue of board diversity has therefore been pursued along two
contrary theoretical lines. Firstly, it has been explored from within the prevailing
theoretical position as a mechanism for contributing to social progress via the
maximization of shareholder value and secondly it has been approached through a more
marginal discourse of corporate social responsibility that relates diversity to
representational democracy. This later development represents a relatively interesting
development in stakeholder theory. At it’s most radical level, the right to representation in
relation to the activities of the corporation is based on the composition of society rather
than any direct connection between the activities of the management team and for
example, the employees, customers or local community. This particular development in
Board Diversity, The Logic of Difference & The Logic of Equivalence
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stakeholder theory is motivated by the more critical form of CSR scholarship that is
committed to more democratic, just and sustainable forms of economic activity. However,
it also resonates with a more pervasive trend in public representation more generally.  
The emerging stakeholder perspective on board diversity therefore represents a shift in
conceptualization from difference construed in terms which present little prospect of the
emergence of a fundamentally different kind of economic system, towards a notion of
difference construed in terms of a pluralism of stakeholder interests and rights. The
question remains however, whether this alternative conceptualization is any more likely to
result in a substantively different or more just mode of economic activity. It is important
that the prevailing paradigm of representative democracy that underpins these
developments is also subject to critical scrutiny in order to determine whether it is an
appropriate foundation for promoting corporate diversity (Brown 2009). The following
section draws on the work of Ernesto Laclau in order to provide a critical reading of these
emerging theoretical developments on board diversity.  In particular, it will be contended
that further critical reflection is required on these emerging forms of representational
democracy if the democratizing of corporations is to lead to any substantive change.
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MANAGERIAL DIFFERENCE AND
THE PROSPECT OF DEMOCRACY
Sections one and two have provided an introduction to the way diversity is currently being
discussed within the corporate governance literature. While the predominant perspective
focuses on agency theory and shareholder value, there is an emerging literature that
connects board diversity to broader political notions of representative and deliberative
democracy. This section critically explores the second emerging perspective. The aim of
this critical reading however is not to delegitimize the discussion of democracy and
corporate governance and to re-enforce a shareholder ideology, rather it is to open up the
debate on the form of democracy we should use to envision new governance structures
(Brown 2009; Pesqueux 2005).
Although new legislative requirements and aspects of the corporate governance literature
are beginning to make the link between board diversity and democratic representation,
there is little critical engagement with the assumptions that underpin this development.
The socially constructed and contested nature of difference itself is also relatively under
theorised
9
(Green 2000; Brah 2000). The critical engagement that exists has tended to
3
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(9) Brah (2000) for example provides four different ways of conceptualizing difference:
- Difference as experience – as in the sense of the life that one experiences
- Difference as social relation – primarily at the level of social structures
- Difference as subjectivity – the issue here is how different subject positions are sustained.  
- Difference as identity. This is related to modes of being and the way in which boundaries between groups are sustained.’
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focus on stakeholder theory (See for example Sternberg 1997) rather than the underlying
assumptions relating to difference and representative democracy. 
This section therefore introduces a parallel discussion of difference and identity politics
that is now well developed within the cultural studies and broader sociological literature.
This discussion is reflective of a prevailing political discourse about the distinctiveness of
specific groups and their attendant rights and needs in contrast to the liberal prioritization
of general society wide interests (Chambers 2004). As the discussion above indicated, at
the core of the emerging stakeholder debate about diversity the board of directors and
governance is the idea that the corporation be made to work in the best interests of society.
This then sets up the important distinction between two collectives, on the one hand the
differential interests of women, men, the aged, disabled persons, shareholders and so on,
and on the other, a second bigger and all encompassing collective called society that
includes all these categories of interests and more. Implicit within the emerging discussion
of diversity within the stakeholder literature there would seem, therefore, to be a
fundamentally important question about the nature of both identity and interests
(Chambers 2004). How best do we secure the interests of those different groups that form
society? This is precisely the subject of Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of the collective public
will or to employ his term, ‘populist demands’.
The remainder of this section draws specifically on Laclau’s work on the logic of difference
and the logic of equivalence to present a critical reading of the issue of board diversity from
a critical cultural studies perspective. The objective of this reading is to locate the issue
of board diversity within a broader critical debate about the effectiveness of
representational models of democracy (Laclau 2007; Chambers 2004). The remainder of
this section introduces Laclau’s work and provides some brief comments on the issues of
identity, representation and representatives with a view to critiquing the potential of
emerging stakeholder and representational democracy perspectives to secure substantive
social change.
Difference, Equivalence & Power
Laclau’s post-Marxist perspective is primarily concerned with the role of ’the people’ as a
collective agent of change.  His work On Populist Reason, for example, explores how it is
possible for a collective will to emerge. Laclau explains,
“Since this emergence of a people is no longer the direct effect of any particular framework, the
question of the constitution of a popular subjectivity becomes an integral part of the question
of democracy” Laclau (2007: 167)
In developing his analysis Laclau initially draws the distinction between what he terms the
logic of difference and the logic of equivalence.   He explains:
Board Diversity, The Logic of Difference & The Logic of Equivalence
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“So we have two ways of constructing the social: either through the assertion of a particularity
– in our case, a particularity of demands – whose only links to other particularities are of a
differential nature (as we have seen: no positive terms, only differences); or through a partial
surrender of particularity, stressing what all particularities have, equivalentially, in common.
The second mode of construction of the social involves, as we know, the drawing of an
antagonistic frontier; the first does not.  I have called the first mode of constructing the social
logic of difference, and the second, logic of equivalence.” (Laclau 2007: 78)
Laclau’s first point is therefore based on the recognition given to two kinds of groups. On
the one had Laclau identifies the specific interests of groups like for example women,
individuals of ethnic origin and shareholders. In terms of our discussion above we might
call these assemblages of interests different stakeholder groups. However, Laclau also
identifies a bigger all encompassing group called variously, ‘the people’, ‘the public’ or the
public interest. The idea that the board could function as a site for the negotiation of
interests, as the emerging stakeholder perspective suggests, implies precisely that this
governance function is part of a broader system of particularities, in Laclau’s terms, the
particularity of demand. Laclau explains
“A society which postulates the welfare state as its ultimate horizon is one in which only the
differential logic would be accepted as a legitimate way of constructing the social.  In this
society, conceived as a continuously expanding system, any social need should be met
differentially.” (Laclau 2007: 78/79; see also Chambers 2004)
However, the same observation can be made in relation to board diversity. It would also
seem that the majority of the discussion about diversity within the corporate governance
literature seems to revolve around what Laclau terms a logic of difference and the
negotiation of the rights of various interest groups. If ‘the social’ is construed in terms of
a particularity of demands of a differential nature, of a collection of stakeholders whose
needs can be met through society, then Laclau concludes that the system is hegemonic and
there is little possibility of substantive social change (Chambers 2004). 
If the system copes with, manages and negotiates particular democratic demands then,
according to Laclau, it is hegemonic
10
(Chambers 2004).  By this Laclau means not only
that a liberal pluralistic system is able to accommodate and domesticate different
interests: the demands of women; the demands of the aged; transsexuals; Christians and so
on quite successfully, but that in doing so it sets the boundaries of possibility of these
various subject positions (Chambers 2004). Chambers (2004: 189) explains,
“There can be no truly radical or contestable political identity within the terms of pluralism,
since identities can only appear in the political realm to the extent that they are equalized or
K. McPhail
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normalized as participants in pluralist competition. In the same way that the capitalist economy
neutralizes all use-values into exchange values, the pluralist market translates all political
challenges or demands into competitive requests.”
According to Laclau, if no equivalential chain emerges between these interests, then there
will be no populist demand or collective will and without a collective will there will be no
substantive change. Laclau’s primary concern here is the way in which a series of diffuse
claims becomes a populist demand. Or, to translate this question into the issue of board
diversity, the extent to which stakeholder concerns could ever become a meaningful
totality capable of securing substantive change. Laclau explains,
“the rejection of a power … requires the identification of all links in the popular chain with an
identity principle which crystallizes all differential claims around a common denominator…In
such a way isolated democratic demands become populist demands. …The first can be
accommodated within an expanding hegemonic formation; the second presents a challenge to
the hegemonic formation.” (Laclau 2007: 82)
The Logic of Equivalence and Identity
A second key aspect in Laclau’s analysis of the emergence of populist demands relates to
the issue of identity. According to Laclau, a plurality of interests does not simply relate to
particular demands, rather they are associated with subject positions (See Green 2000).
He explains,
“This leads us to our second dimension. As we have seen, the movement from democratic to
popular demands presupposes a plurality of subject positions: demands, isolated at the beginning,
emerge at different points of the social fabric and the transition to a popular subjectivity consists
in establishing an equivalential bond between them.“ (Laclau 2007: 86)
Laclau goes on to explain:
“We saw that there is no totalization without exclusion, and that such an exclusion presupposes
the split of all identity between its differential nature, which separates it from other identities,
and its equivalential bond with all others vis-à-vis the excluded element.” (Laclau 2007: 78)
It is therefore important to point out that Laclau equates change not simply with the
equivalence of interest, but with identity, with the emergence of a supra-stakeholder
identity. He contends that populist demands are associated with a populist identity, an
identity that becomes the empty signifier for a wider universality of interests. Thus Laclau
contends that the collective will emerges as disparate social demands coalesce around
some empty signifier, vague enough to accommodate them.
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Representation and Representatives
The final issue to be considered in this section is Laclau’s discussion of representatives
and representation.  This particular notion would seem to be a key aspect in relation to the
broader stakeholder discussion of board diversity introduced in section two above. As Ray
(2005: 93) contended, “Effective reform in corporate governance means making corporate
boards more representative and democratic.” Laclau’s work would suggest a more cautious
and critical analysis of the practice of representational democracy and the likelihood that
it could operate as an effective mechanism of reform.  
Laclau explains that the representative must not only represent the will of those s(he)
represents, but must also give that will credibility within a different context. They are
obliged to present the interests of the group they represent as commensurate with the
interests of society as a whole. However, this in turn reflects the identity of those
represented.  Drawing on the identification of this two-way process, Laclau asks, “What
happens if we have weakly constituted identities whose constitution requires, precisely,
representation in the first place?” In other words, what happens if the group emerges from
the process of representation? So in the context of our subject, the argument that the
composition of the board represents the underlying makeup of the workforce does
precisely what Laclau suggests. It takes difference as a given that precedes
representation instead of seeing the representation or representative as both symbolic and
constitutive of the constituency. According to this perspective, identity does not precede
but rather is an outcome of the process of representation. Laclau talks about the way in
which representation functions in order to homogenize, as in the case of Barack Obama
as the first black president. In this sense then the individual black director or female non
executive serve to homgenize blacks or women as a whole. However, it’s not just that
representation presumes the pre-existence of difference, according to Laclau, the will of
the represented may also be constituted through representation.  He contends, “The main
difficulty with classical theories of political representation is that most of them conceived
the will of the people as something that was constituted before the representation”
(Laclau 2007).
This quote from Chantal Mouffe (2000) captures the crux of Laclau’s concern about the way
in which the democratic ideal of the sovereignty of the people is being translated into new
forms of practice through the liberal discourses of human and identity rights. She says, 
“Instead of simply identifying the modern form of democracy with the empty place of power, I
would also want to put emphasis on the distinction between two aspects: on one side, democracy
as a form of rule that is the principle of sovereignty of the people; and on the other side, the
symbolic framework within which this democratic rule is exercised.  The novelty of modern
democracy, what makes it properly ‘modern’, is that with the advent of the democratic revolution
the old democratic principle that ‘power should be exercised by the people’ emerges again, but
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this time within a symbolic framework informed by the liberal discourse, with its strong
emphasis on the value of individual liberties and human rights.”  (Mouffe, 2000: 2)
Laclau and Mouffe’s concerns seem directly relevant to the new symbolic forms of
representational democracy being proposed in relation to board diversity and the election
of board representatives.
CONCLUSION
While the boards of corporate entities have traditionally consisted of a group of
homogeneous individuals with similar socio-economic backgrounds, the idea of diversity
is emerging as an important contemporary topic within the corporate governance. Recent
legislative reforms introducing mandatory quotas in relation to female directors has served
to heighten interest in this area. While a business case is made for these changes, they
also find their underlying motivation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
can be understood as an attempt to secure greater diversity in political representation. As
the academic accounting community begins to engage with these significant developments,
this paper cautions against the uncritical acceptance of the ideological commitment to
representational forms of democracy on which these reforms along with other emerging
contributions to the literature from a stakeholder perspective, would appear to be based. 
By drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau in particular, the paper attempts to problematize
notions of difference and representational democracy with the intention of stimulating
further debate on the democratizing potential of the recent political interventions in the
composition of the boards of directors. As stated in the introduction, the paper is premised
on the assumption that as this debate emerges and begins to take form, it is important that
the prevailing paradigm of democracy is not taken for granted but also subject to critical
scrutiny (Brown 2009). 
The aim of this paper however is not to delegitimize any discussion of corporate democracy
and re-enforce a shareholder ideology, rather it is to open up the debate on what form this
democracy should take. As Laclau explains,
“Once the articulation between liberals and democracy is considered as merely contingent, two
obvious conclusions do necessarily follow: (1) other contingent articulations are also possible,
so that there are forms of democracy outside the liberal symbolic framework (the problem of
democracy, seen in its true universality, becomes that of the plurality of frameworks which make
the emergence of a ‘people’ possible.”) (2) since the emergence of a ‘people’ is no longer the
direct effect of any particular framework, the question of the constitution of a popular
subjectivity becomes an integral part of the question of democracy.” Laclau 2007: 167). 
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In this quote, Laclau brings us to the nub of the concern of this paper. The discourse
surrounding board diversity has provided an opportunity for those interested in corporate
social responsibility to talk about corporate governance, interest groups and representative
democracy. However, as the Social in CSR becomes increasingly defined in terms of the
disparate interests of stakeholder groups, a move reflective of the broader discourse on
human rights (Thomas 2008), Laclau views such developments as indicative of a
hegemony that not only sets the conditions of possibility for individual stakeholders but
mitigates against the possibility of the emergence of a collective will that might lead to
substantive social change. 
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